



## THE IRAQI KURDISTAN FROM REBELLIONS TO CIVIL WAR 1918- 1998

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**Abstract:** *With the purpose of understanding the present-day of political dynamics of Iraqi Kurdistan it is essential to explore them historically. Therefore, this study is illustrated the historical background of Iraqi Kurdish political landscape from 1918 to 1998, paying particular attention to why the Kurds of Iraq fought for the right to self-government autonomous state and failed to obtain the political objectives of their rebellions during this time. The periodic Kurdish revolutions in Iraq and their outcomes are presented in chronological order. This study is divided into some sections, namely, the British mandate occupation in 1918 and Sheikh Mahmud's uprisings; the Barzani's revolts and the Iraqi kingdom governments. The Kurds and the Iraqi Republic 1958-1968; the Kurds and the Ba'ath regime 1968-1996; the Gulf War and the Kurdish situation; the Kurdish uprising and the United Nations resolution to create safe haven for Kurds as well as Operation Provide Comfort also the international and regional policies towards the Kurds in post-Gulf War Iraq. This study also shows the root of internal conflict of the Iraqi Kurds and the reason behind of the Iraqi Kurdish civil War. It presents the role of the regional players in the Kurdish civil war also the regional and international mediation endeavours to end the Kurdish civil war. The reason for choosing this study is that it emergence as a starting point to delineate the Kurdish modern history is that Southern Kurdistan (now Kurdistan Region of Iraq) was occupied by the British army and attached to modern state of Iraq. The rationale behind picking out this period is that it appears as the cut-off point for discussing the Iraqi Kurdish political history is the emergence of the Kurdish opposition party that has altered the Kurdish political dynamics in the region. Before delineating the Iraqi Kurdish. This study is presented a significant account of confidently not publicized details about these parties. Particular attention is given to relation between successive Iraqi governments' reactions to the Kurds, Kurdish political groups' challenges, the neighbouring countries attitude with the Kurdish issue, Anfal campaigns, the Kurdish civil war as well as the regional and international reactions to the Kurdish civil war. .*

**Keywords:** *the Kurdish issue, Kurdish leaders, Kurdish political parties, Anfal Campaign, Kurdish internal challenges, civil war, Iraqi governments, U. S, Turkey, France, British and the United Nations roles and mediations.*

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## **1. INTRODUCTION**

Kurds might share the same customs, ethnicity and history, however, Kurds do not necessarily share the same objectives and perspectives. They are separated by religion, dialect of language, and national boundaries. Their divided has proofed through the countries they live in. Further, through governments playing one party against another, the Kurdish issue has been used by central governments as a means to obtain what they wanted, moreover then it has been tossed away. Kurds have endured mistreat, betrayal, prejudice, and have been massacred by governments furthermore fellow Kurds. Kurds have learnt that government support cannot be relied on also they have mastered that ethnic relations did not bind. They have struggled harder for what they want, or what they have likewise little is taken for granted. As consequence, they frequently have sincere in others not from their same region or tribe, and their leaders do not trust what they do not control. Even though, the Kurds have always enjoyed a comparatively large amount of cultural freedom and opportunity in Iraq, Kurds have had an active history of revolutions. In Iraq their existence as a separate ethnic faction, with a different heritage, language and culture has never been denied. The Iraqi Kurdistan is crucial to the economy. Kurdistan is a region in agriculture and affluent in oil, granting its Kurdish inhabitants more power. The Iraqi governments have always embraced its minorities as distinct however integral components of the state. The various Kurdish leaders and the central administrations have almost always been willing to negotiate with the other when it is advantageous, nonetheless they have been just as probably to forgo negotiations, when they sense the other is weak, or isolated. The Kurds under successive Iraqi governments have rarely been united behind a particular leader or cause furthermore the successive governments have repeatedly recognized and oppressed this weakness(Hooks 1996).

After the First World War, a modern Iraq was a British protectorate. The British mandate chose King Feisal who was a king in Syria, upon the throne of the newly created artificial state. Iraq could hardly be called a stable state of the Middle East at the time. The allocation of the Mosul Vilayet (Kurdish issue) continued undermined, and loyalty to the newly created state was uncertain. Even though, it was already that Kurdish nationalist liberation movement of self-determination were probably to drag on unfulfilled, the Kurds were not pleased with being subjugated to an Arab state or rule. In an endeavour to bring more



control over Iraq, the British mandate supported the policy of appointing tribal or popular heads as governors over their areas of influence. Although, in many cases this strengthened the influence of the local leader, it further as means of gaining the leaders loyalty (Malanczuk 1991; Stansfield 2006).

## **2. SHEIKH MAHMUD BARZINJI'S REVOLUTION**

Sheikh Mahmud was appointed as the governor of Sulamaniyah. He from an illustrious Qadri Sufi religious house, and partially due to this religious association, he was seen as a representative of traditional society, which many more modern Kurdish intellectuals blamed for the current Kurdish predicament. He was only a minor Sheikh at the time, however, Mahmud was an overwhelmingly ambitious religious man. As rapidly as he was appointed governor, he considered to develop and expand his authority. Although, the British mandate had excluded some areas like Kirkuk, Bahdinan areas around Mosul Vilayet, likewise several significant tribes, from his area of authority, with the purpose of limiting his power, many if the other tribes endorsed him as governor(Mcdowall 1992). As governor, Sheikh endeavoured to show a unified Kurdistan frontline also pressed the British mandate for larger autonomy state. As his shore up among the tribes advanced, so did sheikh demands, and ultimately the British assumed to reject selecting him. In an endeavour to challenge him, without openly removing him, the British mandate drawn-out his authority over other areas, purposely making conflicts with other tribes. Some of the other Kurdish tribes were opposed to his rule also they revolted against him, with the supporting of the Iraqi-British mandate. Realizing that working for the British mandate as governor was no longer advantageous, Mahmud revolted against the British mandate, and announced his kingdom in Sulamaniyah. The British mandate moved troops and rapidly stopped the revolt. What occurred to Mahmud next was questionable. There were several rational accounts that he was jailed in Baghdad. According to other he was exiled to India. According to another relevant account, the British mandate condemned him to death but later commuted his sentence. It is believed he escaped from captivity and fled to Sadasht, in Iranian Kurdistan, where he remained his military rivalry to the British mandate authorities(Entessar 1992).

Sheikh Mahmud was allowed to return Sulamaniyah in 1922. Sheikh immediately assumed to organise an opposition to the Iraqi kingdom government under British mandate auspice. Mahmud proclaimed his Kingdom again, with himself as king. To assert his independence



authority, Sheikh issued stamps, and organized an independent armed forces as well as instigated another uprising (Izady 1992). Once again, tribal challenges hindered the drive for independence. Moreover, few Kurdish tribes particularly Badinan tribes differentiated between being ruled through him or the British mandate; they wanted independence also did not wish to be ruled by either. Despite this, Sheikh had enjoyed having a greater power base.

At this time, nonetheless, Mustafa Kamal Atatürk's forces came to the Mosul Vilayet with the purpose of enforcing their territorial argued to the area. Fearing the secular Turks further their legendary savagery, furthermore than the British mandate, some Kurds switched sides from the anti-British mandate Sheikh side to the side of the British, to combat the Turks (Izady 1992). As a consequence, the Sheikh suddenly lost a lot of his support. Under these conditions, along with some beating by ground forces as well as British Air Forces bombings, the revolt was destroyed in 1924 (Entessar 1992).

In 1925, the Mosul Vilayet was attached to Iraq. The League of Nations did, however, require Iraqi Kingdom to permit cultural also social autonomy for the Kurds. Kurdish and Arabic were both recognized the official language in Mosul also Kurdish children were to receive their education in Kurdish. Disappointed with Iraqi kingdom rule, Shiekh Mahmud Barzinji was led another ill-fated uprising in 1927 in Sulamaniyah, in which was rapidly defeated by the British-Iraqi forces. Sheikh was fled to Iran where he instigated another uprising in Mariwan. This was rapidly destroyed by the Iranian forces, and Sheikh was fled back to Kurdistan, where he was captured and placed in internal exile in Southern Iraq.

After decades of destroying Kurdish nationalist liberation movement, neither the British mandate, nor the Iraqi kingdom were considered to include any provisions for Kurdish autonomy in the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930, which provided for an independent Iraq in 1932. Protesting the lack of provisions for the Kurds, Sheikh Mahmud revolted one last time, demanding political autonomy, and not independent. This time, Sheikh had several difficulty increasing shore up, yet dealt to hold out for a year before the British forces crushed him in 1931. On the other side, in 1932, an amendment to the treaty included provisions for teaching Kurdish in schools and elections of local Kurdish officials (Izady 1992; Malanczuk 1991).



Sheikh Mahmud might have been continued in his rivalry to the central government of Iraqi kingdom in Baghdad, yet he was not supposed a sincere Kurdish patriot. Since he did not struggle to form a Kurdistan autonomous status in Kurdish areas in Iraqi Kurdistan, but just wanted to form his kingdom in Sulamaniyah. He was principally interested in advancing himself also leading the Kurdish issue provided him with the means to achieve his personal purpose. If he had been more respected and capable of transcending tribal differences, uniting the Kurds behind him in the early 1920's, feasibly Kurdish political history might be different. The Kurds were incapable to provide a unified frontline, at the time when they had rational wishes of still obtaining autonomy or independence. Furthermore, they needed a leader who possessed the charisma and integrity which might have been essential. Sheikh Mahmud was the only one willing to lead them, however, he was more self-interested in increasing himself, than the Kurdish issue(Hooks 1996; Mohammed 2013).

### **3. SHEIKH AHMED OF BARZANI REVOLT**

Meanwhile, the Barzani family began to appear as another basis for Kurdish movement in Kurdistan of Iraq. In 1927, the first of the gigantic Barzani head tribe Sheikh Ahmed of Barzan, a Naqshabani Kurdish Sufi religious leader, led a revolution demanding a Kurdistan independent state. Some relevant account explored that Ahmed used religion as a way to unify the Kurds behind him. He made a new religion approach combining aspects of Christianity, Islam, Judaism, and the Cult of Angles. As the leader, and a founder of this new approach, Ahmed recognized himself one of its divine spirits(Izady 1992). It is indefinite whether Sheikh Ahmed was simply a religious zealot or the new religion was created as a novel method to broaden his approach support. Nevertheless, the new approach alienated some other tribes, which might have otherwise shored up him. His new approach was strong also violated some simple Muslim beliefs. According to Hooks Sheikh Ahmed substituted his own name in the call to prayer, proclaimed that it was all right to eat pork, and he even called for the Quran to be destroyed (Mcdowall 2003).

Regarding of his new religious approach eccentricity, his demands for independence were sparked, due to he opposed a British Mandate plan to resettle some Assyrian Christians who had been kicked out from Turkish areas, near the Barzanis villages further as a means to acquire some of the revenue from the Kurdish oil-rich fields. But his son-in-law Masoud Barzani had rejected that accusations and claimed that he treated everyone equally. Heavy



casualties from ground forces and British Air Forces bombing the Barzani to escape to Turkey. The British and Iraqi government then offered amnesty to Sheikh Ahmed and his followers. They returned to Iraq, merely to be apprehended as well as sent into exile in some Iraqi cities in the Southern parts and then finally Sulamaniyah(Barzani 2003).

In reflection, it was reckless for the Iraqi kingdom government to stop Sheikh Ahmed as severely as they did. His new approach proclamations were so strong, that not even all of Barzani villages might support him in his struggle, further other tribes were so offended through his beliefs, which they too were ready to revolt against him. But, Baghdad decided to create an instance of him. They heavily bombed left many civilian casualties, and turned many Kurds who did not support Ahmed against the central government. The British mandate further tarnished their image, through using delayed action bombs that was in violation of the 1907 Hague Convention (Mcdowall 2003). Through creating an instance of a religious fanatic, who many supposed to be deranged, they lost the shore up of plenty of victims of the bombings. Additionally, Sheikh Ahmed revolt provided the indoctrination of the Sheikh younger, Mullah Mustafa Barzani (Hooks 1996).

#### **4. THE EARLY YEARS OF MULLAH MUSTAFA BARZANI**

Mullah Mustafa Barzani was perhaps the most legendary and revered Kurdish leader. He did not inherit his family's religious fanaticism further was more of a secular leader. However, he was a strong tribal leader. For over fifteen years he did lead the Kurdish Nationalist Liberation Movement in Iraq in their demands for political autonomous state. His tribal orientation irritated many, more progressive, modern Kurds, who blamed the backwards tribal system, for protecting the Kurds divided. However, he was the significant Kurdish leader of his time also his legacy is still a symbol of Kurdish wishes. His unique capability to combine his secular and religious influence into a charismatic leadership united a broad spectrum of Kurds behind him. This legendary leader; '...failed to achieve his goals of Kurdish autonomy, but his stubborn attempts to obtain it, and his unique ability to inspire other Kurds to continue the fight, made him a nationalist hero for all the Kurds, irrespective of their place of domicile'(Hooks 1996).

In 1943, Mullah Mustafa Barzani run-away from Sulamaniyah, at the same time declared leadership of the tribe. Briefly, after his escape, he established a small group of force, who became well-known modern force Peshamarga (those who face death), which assumed to



assault symbols of the government. Within a year, Barzani had enough forces to fend off Iraqi armed forces. Nuri Sai'd the Iraqi prime minister imposed Barzani's Brother Sheikh Ahmed to send him a letter inquiring him to surrender himself. This simply caused Mustafa Barzani to intensify his raids. In 1944, the central government representative consisting mainly of Kurds was negotiated with Barzani. Among his requests was the formation of an autonomous Kurdish state (which include Kirkuk) moreover increasing a number of Kurds in central government positions(Akyol 2010; Wichhart 2007).

Furthermore, Sheikh Ahmed was freed. Nonetheless, as the central government was debating these demands, the government fell, further the new Prime Minister Hamdi Al-Pachachi called of the negotiations also fighting restarted. The Iraqi armed forces, with the British Air Forces ultimately stressed Mustafa Barzani to escape to Iran. While he was there, he played a significant role in the short-lived Kurdistan Republic (Mahabad Republic) in 1946(Eagleton 1963).

## **5. MULLAH MUSTAFA BARZANI FROM 1960-1975**

After the 1958 coup, Kurdish national rights and culture was permitted to flourish. The Iraqi flag had the Kurdish sun (a yellow disk, surrounded by seven red rays) furthered to the centre between 1959 and 1963(Entessar 1992). During that time a Kurdish University was formed in Sulamanyah. Despite those there were some small wars between Iraqi armed forces and Barzani's Peshmarga force also by 1961 another Kurdish revolution was underway(Izady 1992). From this point until 1975, the Kurds were intermittently at war with the various successive governments, which ruled Iraq(Hooks 1996).

After the fighting began, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), initially turned towards the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP), proposing a joint effort at toppling the Iraqi Prime Minister Abdul Karim Qassim (1958-1963). After their demands was refused, they assumed to shore up the Baathist Party. Nonetheless, by 1963, Mustafa Barzani's Peshmarga force had inflicted severe casualties on the Iraqi armed forces. His successful used of guerrilla tactics further the mountainous terrain had taken its toll. Qassim was enforced to negotiate a ceasefire further turned his attention towards other political adversaries(Nagel 1978; Rubin 2007). Briefly, after the armistice was announced, on 18 February 1963 in a military coup d'état, Qassim was toppled by the Baathists Party under the leadership of his soul mate Abdul Salam Arif and assumed his presidency. The Baathist government effectively opted to



honour the armistice, as well as with the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) support turned its concern to purging Communists from the central government in Baghdad(Karol 2009).

Shortly, after the coup d'état of 1963, the proposed union of Iraq and Syria started to frustrated the Kurds. They might have much less impact in a combined state, where they might be a much smaller minority. Jalal Talabani a politburo member of the KDP, who sometimes pro-Barzani and sometimes anti-Barzani, visited Cairo to meet with Jamal Abdul Nasser Egypt president as part of an Iraqi delegation. He presented two plans to Nasser, detailing Kurdish demands for political autonomy in Iraq itself, as well as their offers, in case the of a mixture with the United Arab Republic. Nasser was astonishingly supportive of Kurdish demands, even though he might not shore up entire self-government status. Nevertheless, the Kurds felt that the government would be less believed to prop up their demands in the case of a mixture, thus they certainly developed their demands upon the central government. At times, the central government discussed separately with Mustafa Barzani and the left-wing of the KDP under leadership Talabani.

Mustafa Barzani was requesting self-government autonomy of virtually all of the Kurdish areas around Mosul province, including oil-rich field Kirkuk. Barzani further offered separate armed forces also two-thirds of the national oil-revenues. The central government in Baghdad certainly supposed Barzani's offers to be excessive further than assumed discussing with Talabani group. At first, the Baathist government appeared believed to approve Talabani's offers, which was complete autonomy with the exception of foreign affairs, finance, and national defence. Nonetheless, the certain advancing rift in the KDP, led them to suppose that they would have more triumph in a military operation that Qassim did, hence the central government abruptly called off negotiations and war broke out again(Mcdowall 1996).

Before, President Salam Arif pulled his coup in 1963, he communicated with Mustafa Barzani, offering him a case-fire and pledged to ignore the left-wing of the KDP Talabani group. In return Mustafa Barzani was to lend his forces in toppling the Qassim's regime. Mustafa Barzani was assured that the war with the central government in Baghdad could be wait also seized on the chance to become the sole leader of the Kurdish nationalist liberation movement. On 14 February 1964, Barzani acting individually of his KDP signed an



armistice with the Baathist government. The armistice reinstated government control over Kurdish areas, lifted the economic blockade, and allowed cultural freedom. The armistice created no point of self-government status that had long been the cornerstone of the Kurdish movement demands. Furthermore, it referred to Kurdistan with the Arab code word the Northern Region, a term the Kurds prior never might permit to be used in discussions(Wolfe 2011).

The left-wing of the KDP Talabani group suddenly discovered itself in a bend. Since Mustafa Barzani has returned from the Soviet Union, the KDP intelligentsia had recognized upon his prestige and impact among the tribes, by portraying as the heroic Kurdish leader, with the purpose of gaining more shore up for the KDP. Mustafa Barzani, though he was nominally the president of the right-wing of the KDP, had separated himself, discussed individually further had even gone as far as to openly showed that it was approvable for the government to abolish political parties, if it was in Iraq's best interests, and he had assumed receiving arms from Arif. However, this researcher supposed Barzani has receive no weapons from Arif, if he had received than the Soviet might have granted him some. Since the Soviet was supporting the Kurdish issue(Wanche 2002).

The Talabani group of the KDP, called for a KDP Sixth Congress, in which officially condemned Mustafa Barzani's action. In replied, Barzani called his own right-wing KDP group Sixth Congress, in which Barzani announced the other congress to be outlaw further captured any prominent member of the left-wing KDP Talabani faction who attended. Briefly, afterwards, he sent his son Idris, with a massive forces of pro-right wing, who were kicked out Talabani, his father in-law Ibrahim Ahmed, and nearly four thousands of Talabani KDP left-wing supporter into exile Iran(Gunter 1994; Mcdowall 1992).

Once Barzani was undisputed head of the right-wing of the KDP and the complete Kurdish movement. He declared the terms of the armistice that he had negotiated with the Baathist government of Salam Arif to insupportable further returned to his previous position of demanding nothing less than entire self-government autonomous state. Then using the weapons he obtained from Soviet Union, he restarted fighting against central government of Arif(Hooks 1996).

Despite the rift in the KDP, in 1965, the central government in Baghdad was imposed to negotiate a resolution with Barzani. In 1966, the moderate civilian Prime Minister Abdul



Arhman Al-Bazzaz had negotiations with Barzani in a very generous agreement, giving the Kurds political autonomous state within Iraq, including a locally government, further several assurances of cultural freedom. However, the agreement was never fulfilled, Al-Bazzaz was enforced to resign. Furthermore, the fighting was again resumed. Up to this point, the Kurds were developing in their movement against the central government in Baghdad with advance arms, money, intelligence, and food supplied from Israel, Iran and Soviet Union. Otherwise, the US and British was supporting the Iraqi government(Disney 1980; Gunter 1994).

After the second Baathist coup in July 1968, the challenges between Talabani and Barzani factions, led the latter side to advance links with the new Baathist administration, who shared its socialist concepts. In return for its shore up, the Talabani faction side was given entire power in the region between Kirkuk and Sulamaniyah. They even fought along with the Iraqi forces against Barzani Peshamrag forces. Nonetheless, by this point, Mustafa Barzani had become a serious threat to the central government of the second Baathist government. He led an armed force of nearly 20,000 fighters who were well equipped with anti-aircraft guns, field guns, and anti-tank weapons, supplied by Iran and Israel as well as Soviet Union. Since Talabani's faction were supporting the second Baathist government turn the tide of the war, moreover granting them some form of autonomy no longer advantaged Baghdad, the central government abandoned Talabani. He humbly returned to fight alongside Barzani against Baghdad(Gunter 1999).

In 1970, Iraqi vice-president imposed to discuss another peace settlement with Barzani. Meanwhile, the Iraq armed forces stand against Saddam's negotiation with Barzani, they felt humiliating and favoured war. However, the four major provisions of the agreement included: 1) Kurdish was recognized as the second nationallanguage; 2) a Kurdish autonomous state was to be formed in years for the signing of this agreement.3) only Kurdish speaking officials were to be appointed to the region; 4) the vice president of Iraq was to be a Kurd. Even though, although the treaty sounded pledging, it soon became absolute that the agreement was simply to placate the rebel, as well as the central government never intended to situate the provisions in conclusion(Gunter 2004; Stansfield 2006).



By 1974, the details of how the autonomous Kurdistan state was to be government was promulgated by the central government with anti-Barzani tribes. The power remained in Baghdad also the fighting restarted. Despite the great amounts of support the Kurds were receiving, they were ultimately beaten back. By the end of 1974, the Iraqi armed forces captured more of Kurdistan areas than it had since 1961. The Iraqi armed forces might ordinarily took out from the mountains as winter fell, hence permitting the Kurds to re-faction and rally shores up in time for the spring offensives. Nonetheless, that winter they remained in the mountains. Furthermore, it became evident that the Kurds only wished to control their ground was with the straight support of Iranian forces. Even though, some Iranian soldiers wore Kurdish traditional clothes had fought side by side Barzani's Peshmarga force, Iran was not willing to overtly commit forces, or in other words assumed a full scale warfare (Stansfield 2006; Stansfield 2003).

Whereas the Baathist government continued in power, on 6 March 1975, Iraq and Iran with the mediation of Anwar Sadat, King of Jordan, King of Saudi Arabia and Algiers president signed the Algiers Accord at the Organization of Exporting Petroleum Countries (OPEC) summit, the Shah of Iran obtained some territorial concessions he wanted. And in return, withdrawn his support for the Kurdish movement, as a consequence the Kurdish movement collapsed. Barzani fled to Iran as well as finally, to the United States, where he died of cancer in 1979 (Korn 1994; Waisy 2015).

With Barzani's movement fall in 1975, the KDP as well as divided to several parties. In 1975, Talabani formed the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), while in exile in Syria, Damascus also was the first to return Peshmargas to Iraqi Kurdistan. Mullah Mustafa Barzani's two sons Idris and Massu'd continued active in some splinter groups of the old KDP relying on tribal links as the main of their shore up. In 1979, they reconstructed the party title of KDP. After Idris died of heart attack in 1989, Massoud resumed entire control of the KDP. Ironically, the two challenger parties both supported the same old KDP objectives 'Autonomy for Kurdistan, Democracy for Iraq' (Gunter 2009).

## **6. THE KURDS DURING OF IRAQ-IRAN WAR**

Barzani's territory, lay along Iraq's northern border with Turkey, whereas Talabani's area lay farther south, around Sulamaniyah in the mountains separating Iraq from Iran. This became a reason of significance when Iran declared its invasion of Iraqi Kurdistan in 1983. t the



Iranian had the option of including Talabani in their plan, otherwise they spurned this, probably due to they saw him as unacceptable secular, and further too much of a leftist. However, it was also feasible that Massuod Barzani blackballed his father's old-fashion foe. In any event, after Haji Umran the Iranians in quick succession conducted a number of other invasion of Iraqi Kurdistan, one of these to Talabani's area. This put the latter in a quandary, he did not want to support the Iranians, who scorned him. To some extent, he wished to support Baghdad, whom he was considering as his ally's. Talabani warned the Iranians to stay out of his territory, and when they neglected his warning further assaulted near Penjwin, he order his forces to struggle back (Pelletiere 1991).

Yet fearing fundamentalist Iran, when the war was going poorly for Iraq, in 1984, the central government of Baghdad attempted to strike managing with the PUK in exchange for their support. The concessions created by Saddam Hussein, were greater than those granted to Barzani in 1970 accord. The central government approved to permit an expanded autonomous area, which included Kirkuk. There were to be free elections, and the region was to receive 25-30 % of the Iraqi state budget. Talabani became Saddam's 'governor' in Southern Kurdistan of Iraq, with the responsibility of guarding the area, which he proposed to do with his PUK party fighters and whatever other Kurds, he could recruit. In the meantime, Saddam approved to exempt Kurds from the draft, an inducement to joint Talabani. Finally, Saddam and Talabani would work out autonomy arrangement for all of the Kurds (Izady 1992).The new agreement has given the PUK an opportunity to lessen its dependence on Syria. In the words of a PUK official, "We know the agreement will not last, but at least it has proved that we are independent from Damascus or any other regimes.... It has given us a breathing space, which we will use to prepare for the next onslaught" (Entessar 1984). Nonetheless, this agreement was never signed due to a number of differences causes. Turkey protested also Turkish-Iraqi cooperation and join action against the Kurdish movement. Turkey who has been fighting with her own massive Kurdish population, feared that an autonomous Iraqi Kurdistan region might support Kurds in Turkey, as well as the two might attempt to unite their land and form a Kurdistan independent state(Izady 1992).

Furthermore, Iraqi who was contingent upon the oil pipelines which go through Turkey for international market, granted Turkey the right to cross the border to pursue any Kurdish



revolt. Additionally, Iraq further started to obtain support from the United States, Soviet Union, and France to prevent it from being defeated by Iranian forces. This developed Iraq's armed forces capability. Another factor was Baghdad's rejection to abandon its irregular Iraqi Kurdish allies, derisively termed the government collaborator 'Jash' by the Kurdish nationalists. However, the 'light Brigades' also 'Salahadin Knights' by the central governments, still a moreover reason was the execution of twenty-four young Kurds in March 1994, for desertion also avoidance of the draft additionally, Talabani's brother, Sheikh Hama Salih, and his two daughters were as well killed by Iraqi forces. Finally, plenty of Iraqi Kurds were assumed to shore up Iran due to they were anticipated an Iranian victory over Iraq(Gunter 1992).

Talabani appeared to have fallen victim to intrigues. At the time, a number of powerful Kurdish tribal leader (Agas) had sided with the Baathist government, being nominally allied with them against Iranians. These pro-Iraqi government tribal leader called the Knights (Fursan) were not pleased to have Talabani emerge as a power broker in their midst. One who could deal directly with Saddam Hussein's brutal regime, in first place, they remembered Talabani from his student days, as an opponent of the 'Agas-mentality'. Along with this they regarded him as a Johnny-come lately, whom they did not want muscling in on their territory. Also sometime in 1984, some Kurdish tribal heads arranged the assassination of one of Talabani's top lieutenants. This had an effect of discrediting him, as he subsequently proved incapable of avenging the act. The Kurds who are extraordinary sensitive to matters of honour refused after that to pay him deference (Pelletiere 1991). The PUK then broke off relations with Baghdad and went to fight alongside Iran and the KDP. The two parties then combined, establishing the Kurdish front in Iraqi Kurdistan(Gunter 2004).

## **7. THE ANFAL CAMPAIGNS**

It rapidly turned out to be absolute, that the Baathist government was going to retaliate against the Kurds for struggling with Iran against it. On 13 July 1983, the Iraqi armed forces declared between five and eight thousand males of the Barzani tribe also abused them away. They were never seen again. This punitive action marks the first major instance of Saddam's international policy to target civilian populations rather than KDP forces or leadership. When later asked what occurred to them Saddam replied 'We meted out a stern



punishment to them, and they went to hell'(Hooks 1996; Miller 2014). After that Saddam executed a series of harsh reprisals on the Kurds, in retaliation for their cooperation with Iran. These were set up against all Kurds in Iraqi Kurdistan, without differentiating between those who fought with Iran further those who fought for his regime. There were a series of eight campaigns between February and September 1988 in which Saddam brushed from the south-eastern corner of Iraqi Kurdistan to the north western corner demolishing Kurdish villages, fields, and ruthlessly murdering thousands of Kurds. During the campaigns the Kurds recurrently fell victim to chemical weapons, had their homes burned, wells poisoned and filled with cement(Ahmad 2014).

The Kurds were victims of massive executions also were buried in mass graves, forcing thousands of flee to neighbouring countries. Throughout the operations, men were rounded up and sent to resettlement camps, captured, or executed. Women and children were further captured, sent to resettlement camps, executed, or dropped off in the Middle of the desert. In every areas assaulted, the villages were entirely destroyed. It is estimated that over 4,700 villages were demolished also over 180,000 civilians were killed with either conventional or chemical weapons(Watch 1993; Yildiz 2007). The brutality of the operations was revealed in orders issued to the defence minister which included the following concepts:

- a) The crop commanders shall carry out sporadic bombardments using artillery, helicopters and aircraft, at all times of the day or night, in order to kill the largest number of people present in those prohibited zones, keeping us informed of the results.
- b) All people captured in those villages shall be detained and interrogated by the security services and those between the ages of 15 and 70 shall be executed after any useful information has been obtained from them.

When in 1987-88, the Kurds had had chemical weapons and Anfal campaign attack by the Baathist regime in Baghdad, Mahmud Othman as a representative of Kurdish movement went to Washington. But could not see anybody. Since the U.S administration of that time had good relations with Saddam. Then Saddam was at war with Khomeini and the U.S. thought the danger is Khomeini and they were supporting Saddam. Therefore Othman (2000) proved that, "We came to Washington and we tried to see anybody in State Department, or



at the Iraqi desk, or at the human rights desk. To talk to them about our sufferings, especially the chemical weapons because it is prohibited internationally. So Saddam is doing something which is violating all international laws, so they should at least stand for the international laws, if they don't stand for the Kurds”.

Since the international community and the United State did not believed in the Kurdish leaders' accusation, in which they told the reporters, the Iraqi government used international forbidden chemical weapons against Kurds. So most of the information about the Anfal operations was not discovered until after the Gulf War, 'when Kurdish rebels took advantage of Saddam's to seize large chunks of territory in Iraq's northern oil-fields, including the cities of Kirkuk and Sulamaniyah.' The Kurds controlled four million documents, weighing over 18 tons, detailing the central government campaigns against its own citizens. They further uncovered several massive graves. In 1991, after the Gulf War, the Kurds were pushed to stand up against the Saddam's regime by the United States. Plenty of Kurds interpreted this encouragement as sign that the United States would offer aid to their rebellion, particularly after the US president Bush called on Iraqi people to put the mater into their own hands. As it has been repeatedly occurred throughout history, the Kurds lost when they bet on shore up from anyone other than themselves. The United States chose not to involve as well as the rebellion was crushed within three weeks(Hooks 1996).

## **8. DESERT STORM**

Before desert storm, the Kurds rejected to fight with the allies against Saddam's regime. They even declared that they would take up arms against Turkey if it occupied from the north. Nonetheless, Talabani, did demands that, 'if the Arab forces liberate Kuwait, we would urge the Kurdish troops to join them', but he furthered that, '.... Our fighting would be Kurdish, independent and separate, not. As part of foreign armies invading Iraq or fighting Iraq'(Gunter 1999).

As the Kurds and Shiites in South revolted against Saddam's regime, Saddam attempted to negotiate with the Kurdish front line (both the PUK and the KDP). Originally, Talabani discussed with Baghdad also the negotiations appeared to go marvellous, as Saddam created several concessions, including approving to a democracy. The main obstacles to the peace process, were the lack of an international assurance of the agreement and division of



oil revenues from Kirkuk. Nonetheless, during the next stage of negotiations, in which Masoud Barzani represented the front, the situation changed (Hooks 1996). Barzani declared that since Saddam had approved to a democracy, he would support him, and international guarantees were not necessary. When asked what Saddam's perspective of democracy was he replied.

This Excellency, the president has 24 years of experience in government. We believe that this is the best way to serve Iraq, the Baathist Party, the government, and the Iraqi people (Gunter 1999).

Considering the Kurdish share of the oil from Kirkuk, he stated: 'Oil, whether in Kirkuk or other areas, belongs to the central government'. He showed that the only point of contention was defining the autonomous region. He moreover stated that, 'President Saddam Hussein has spoken about essential points and proved his love for the Kurds, his concern for the Kurdish problem, and the soundness of his treatment of its development'. During this period relations between the KDP and PUK developed more tense. Barzani remained to discuss with Saddam even after the safe haven was announced, securing another autonomy agreement that was never signed. The main factor it was never signed was that it required the Kurds to disband all of their Peshmargas as well as hand their arms over Baghdad government (Gunter 2004).

## **9. OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT**

In 1991 things changed, of course, and Saddam was becoming a danger to the U.S. So they started having a bit different position towards the Kurds. Also, because Kurds were an important element. They were the only armed strong opposition, which they have there on the ground. And they could challenge the government more than any other opposition in Iraq so they had to deal with it. After the Iraq attack on Kuwait Mahmud Othman as a head of a Kurdish delegation led by Kurdistan Front was again in Washington. They were going there to see State Department again. Same old story. Something happened in-between, which was not so good, and it was a mistake, from Othman's view was from the Kurdish side. They went into negotiation with Saddam while we were in America waiting for State Department to see us. The whole delegation was in Baghdad, Talabani and the others were kissing Saddam. It was a blot on our mission. And Othman suppose it was a mistake.



Othman (2000) proved that, "We went to State Department again. This time we were received of course. And they told us, 'now look we have no policy to interfere in your country.' We told them, 'but people are by the millions running to the frontier, this is not a matter of policy, it is humanitarian tragedy. You have to do something about it. Six hundred thousand are staying on the frontier of Turkey.' And at that time it was snow and winter, people are dying, children are dying". But The U.S officials stated, "no we can't interfere this is an old story you have with the Iraqis". And Othman said, "But, President Bush said in one of his speeches--we ask the Iraqi people to rise up and change their regime. But you didn't let us change the leader, because you allowed him to use armed helicopters. So now we are his victims. He is running after us. We are running because people are afraid of chemical weapons again. And they said no--'this is an internal conflict".

In the Kurdish areas, the Kurdish factions joined in fighting against central Iraqi government armed forces. In March 1991, however, Iraqi armed forces were capable to crack down the uprising and managed to regime control of the cities of Kirkuk, Erbil, Dohuk, and Zakho, taken by the Kurds. Iraq's recapture of the northern areas set of a mass exodus heading for the borders with Turkey and Iran. As Saddam crushed the uprising, thousands of civilian Kurdish refugees escaped from Iraqi Kurdistan. Over a million fled to Iran and 468,000 fled to Kurdish areas in Turkey. To protect the Kurds from moreover retaliation also to stem the flow of refugees, the United Nations (UN) attempted to form a safe haven above the 34<sup>th</sup> parallel. The thousands of Kurds were to be returned to their homes under safety net provided(Gunter 2011).

In resolution 688 of April 1991, the UN Security Council called for respect for minority rights in Iraq. Measures were subsequently taken by the allies to restrict Baghdad's freedom of action in the Kurdish areas. On 16 April 1991, the United States, France and the United Kingdom declared "Operation Provide Comfort", designed in particular at refugees along the Turkish-Iraqi border. Allied forces were deployed in the area, which Iraqi regime of Baathist's forces ultimately pulled out of; in October 1991, the central government armed forces withdrew from most of the Kurdish areas. Baghdad thereupon declared an economic blocked of the Kurdish areas(Goff 1992).

According to some account, the UN Security Council measures created the stationing or presence of Iraqi armed forces in the Kurdish area undesirable or unauthorised. The allied



forces have further launched the airspace north of the 36 Parallel out of bounds to Iraqi 'planes and helicopter'. And then the No-Fly-Zone was formed with the purpose of protecting local communities. But the no-fly zone or safe haven was meant to be a temporary resolution until Saddam was removed from power or to reach an agreement with Saddam's regime. The Kurds were left in their own safe area, protected from Baghdad's regime by UN forces. All Iraqi services were suppressed and Saddam enforced his own sanction. Since then the Kurds have been in their own land, which is not an independent state or autonomous administration. The Iraqi government of Baathist has been no control over the area(Cockayne&Malone 2006).

For over five year's period now, this temporary circumstance has persisted. Since there was no government with actual authority over the area, the Kurds took advantage of the chance to establish their own administration. In May 1992, election were held and the two major political parties in the area each won about 50 percent of the parliament seats. Each party had wished to win a decisive victory, yet the KDP received 50.22 % of the votes and the PUK received 49.78%. The Kurdish parliament created Erbil its capital(Gunter 2004, 2009).

The central government in Baghdad however, has never recognised either Sothern, the No-fly Zone or autonomous Kurdish state. Since the end of UK-US operation Desert Fox in December 1998 has been involving in active resistance to the zone. The Iraqi government of Saddam has stated that 'it will no longer observe the no-fly zones and will actively resist the presence of allied 'planes in Iraqi airspace. The US and UK 'planes in those zones have been fired on by the Iraqi armed forces, with US 'planes retaliating. The US and the UK were reported to have eliminated radar and missile facilities in the vicinity of Mosul, among other targets.

## **10. RELATIONS WITH THE STATE OF TURKEY**

As a consequence of the Gulf War in 1991, Turkey advanced relations with the Iraqi Kurds, particularly with the KDP along their border. Turkut Ozal Turkish president even stated that, 'Those in the Iraqi Kurdish areas, are relative of our Turkish citizens. So the borders are to some extent artificial, dividing people into two sections'(Gunter 2004).

This was ironic coming up from a state which until now did not have Kurds, but just Mountain Turks. There were several reasons Turkey decided to support the Kurds and the UN enclave. If the Kurds were to become dependent on Turkey, then they would be



susceptible to Turkish influences and less probably to shore up the Turkish Kurds. They further sought to discourage the Iraqi Kurds from yearning independence, and most of all, they felt that their goodwill and strong support for the Kurds might reflect favourably upon them in the west as well as could aid Turkey's chances of joining the European Union. The PUK never established a close relations with Turkey, due to they receive their support from Syrian and Iran Shiites regimes, who supported the Turkey's Kurdistan Worker Party (PKK), who the Turkish government has been fighting a civil war with for the 20 years(Gunter 2011; Hooks 1996).

## **11. THE ROOT OF INTERNAL CONFLICTS**

During the forties several Kurdish parties started to establish. An offshoot of the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDP-I), the KDP in Iraqi Kurdistan became active in developing Kurdish issue. Mullah Mustafa Barzani returned to Kurdistan from Soviet Union after the coup d'état of 14 July 1958. He immediately took the position of president of the KDP, which he was founded on 16 August 1946 in Iranian Kurdistan(Tripp 2002). The party ultimately became divided into two groups. It had a tribal, conservative wing associated with Barzani, and leftist, intellectual, Marxist wing associated with Ibrahim Ahmed, and his son-in-law Jalal Talabani. When Barzani was in the Soviet Union, Ahmed headed the KDP. After Barzani came back, the two groups struggled for control until 1964(Mcdowall 2003; Stansfield 2003).

When Barzani kicked the Talabani faction out from his party, In January1966, Talabani faction moved to Sualmaniyah and then Baghdad. They allied themselves with the Iraqi government and carried out joint operations with the Iraqi forces against the Kurdish movement, led by Mullah Mustafa Barzani. In 1969, Talabani with support of the Iraqi forces controlled Kurdish areas around Sulamaniyah. After that Barzani defeated Talabani forces and fled them into Iran again(Lambert 1997). And then the conservative wing included mainly Northern Kurmanji (Badinani) speaking Kurds from the mountainous areas in the north, and leftist wing included such as South Kurmanji (Sorani) speaking Kurds from towns and cities in the south. The conservative leftist wing tended to be Qadri's. And the conservative right wing tended to be Naqshabandi's. This division ultimately fragmented the KDP, and the Ahmed-Talabani group side would eventually become the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). Both parties remain active challenger in Iraqi Kurdistan until 1992. The



original differences between the two factions of the KDP although, less distinct remain between the PUK and KDP now days(Hooks 1996).

## **12. THE KURDISH CIVIL WAR**

In 1993, the KDP and PUK fell out once again also the parties have sporadically been in armed competition and conflict ever since, while forces from the United Kingdom, France, Turkey, and the United States fly overhead to protect them. It was assessed that there have been over five thousand deaths since the renewals of conflicts. There have been massive cease-fires, otherwise the massive mainstream have just been words without substance.

According to some accounts such Hooks, there were two main disputes which the parties have not been able to resolve. The main conflict between the two parties' outcomes from division of revenues from oil trucks smuggling oil out of Iraq into Turkey through Ibrahim Khalil in Zakho city in the north of Kurdistan. These revenues are valued to be at least \$ 150,000 per day. The KDP controlled the areas along the Turkish borders also it was the suspicious that they were hoarding the money that caused the two parties to conduct fighting. The PUK controlled Erbil continues the second major disputes between the KDP and PUK. The PUK argued that they occupied Erbil in December 1994 to protect the Kurdish parliament from a pending KDP assaults. The PUK also declared that the Kurdistan Parliament that has not met since November 1994, has been freed to meet as it pleases. The KDP rejected to hand over any money to the Parliament of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), meanwhile the PUK took over the city. The KDP argued that as long as Erbil is dominated by the PUK, the Parliament is not also cannot be free as well as requested that the PUK withdrawn from Erbil before they would negotiate peace with the other parties(Hooks 1996).

## **13. INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL PLAYERS MEDIATION ATTEMPTS**

Since the renewal of challenges between the PUK and KDP parties. There have been some endeavours through other states to settle their differences peacefully. In July 1994, the KDP and PUK with France mediation met in Paris, where they accepted to a wide range of provisions including free presidential elections for four year terms, financial, reforms, armed forces structure further even formed the KRG offices in Paris and New York. Nonetheless, they further approved to seek political asylum to other Kurds on condition that they did not use Kurdistan of Iraq as a base for cross border assaults. As Talabani and Massuod Barzani



were getting ready to visit Paris to sign the peace accord, meanwhile Turkey cancelled their transit visas also opposed to the accord showing that it was tantamount to forming a Kurdistan independent state in northern Iraq. Further, instead pushing the Iraqi Kurds to discuss with Iraq (Gunter 1996).

The United States, on the other side, did not want Kurds discussing with the central government in Baghdad moreover as a consequence brokered the next crucial round of consultations in Washington D.C in March 1995. In April 1995, a momentary armistice ensued. The KDP and PUK were incapable to come to terms over the division of revenues or the demilitarization of Erbil. Hence, in July 1995, the fighting broke out between both parties. In August 1995, the US mediated another round of discussing in Drogheda (Hooks 1996). This originally appeared successful, however Turkish government moreover took place in the discussion also at Turkish insistence a clause requiring the KDP to patrol the border was included in the accord.

Before the accord was being signed the Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK) further fearing the loss of its bases in Kurdistan which it has been sued to stage raids Turkish forces assaults the KDP. The assaults were further motivated by the Baathist regime of Syria and Iraq also Iranian fundamentalist Islamic republic who shored up the PKK, with the purpose of preventing the US from gaining any moreover influence in the region. They wished that the PUK might be restarting war with the KDP to aid the PKK with whom they have close links (Gunter 1996).

In October 1995, the Iranian government in Tehran hosted negotiations between its loyal party the PUK and the KDP. Nonetheless, no conclusion was reached. Additionally, in November 1995, another US mediations talk endeavour in Primam (Salahadin) near Erbil failed. The PUK and the KDP kept on fighting back as well as four, and awkward deadlock followed (Hooks 1996).

#### **14. THE IRANIAN AND IRAQI REGIME'S ROLE IN THE KURDISH CIVIL WAR AND U.S**

In July 1996, the condition again altered. The PUK permitted Iranian troops to go after Iranian Kurds who had been using bases in its territory. In returns, the Iranians forces left behind a large cache of weapons, tipping the balance of power between the PUK and the KDP towards the PUK. On 16 August 1996, the PUK broke the year-old third armistice, taking the KDP by astonish as it was that day celebrating its fiftieth anniversary. In the end, the



offensive rebounded on the PUK (Official General Report on Northern Iraq, April 2000). The KDP politburo member Sami Abdul Rhman (2000) proved that, "On 17 August the PUK made a major attack on KDP. The same night, we were celebrating the anniversary of KDP. The Americans were the peace-brokers between us and PUK. We appealed to the Americans to stop this aggression, or at least to condemn it, pressure PUK to stop the fighting and to withdraw from the lands they occupied. Actually they were not prepared to do anything serious because I think the elections of the president".

As a result, on 22 August 1996, Masoud Barzani required Saddam to send in Iraqi National Guards alongside the KDP Peshmargas to control Erbil from the PUK-controlled. On 28 August 1996, the US President Bin Clinton warned Iraqi president Saddam Hussein not to move in armed forces, in replied to Barzani's demanded. On 31 August 1996, Clinton sent another warning telegram. On the same day Saddam, keen on to reassume control of his territory dispatched 40,000 forces alongside the KDP. The PUK was rapidly decimated. The power fighting in Kurdistan of Iraq had lastly ended. Due to the Iraqi armed forces entered Kurdistan, the US declared 44 cruise missile at military sites in Kurdistan of Iraq further extended the area of the no-fly zone (Hooks 1996).

On 4 September 1996, the KDP declared an amnesty under which PUK supporter were permitted to return to their houses in Erbil, provided that they signed a declaration of surrender. Returning PUK members further in some cases had to pay 'caution money'. In September 1996, also the central government in Baghdad decided to lift the economic sanction on Kurdish areas and further declared an amnesty for people in the area. The amnesty excluded, among others, those allegedly involved in 'espionage', a term broad enough to be applicable to people working for humanitarian organizations and operating in the north without Baghdad's consent (Official General Report on Northern Iraq, April 2000). In replied to the threat posed by this and to the deployment of Central Iraqi armed force units in Erbil, the US strongly advised all Americans None-Governmental Organizations (NGOS) to withdraw from Kurdish areas, taking thousands of local staffs with them. At this time, over five thousand Kurdish refugees from Iraq were in the Philippines, awaiting entry into the US.

On 13 October 1996, the PUK, now armed with heavy weapons, returned from Iran also its Peshmarga went on to recover the territory they had lost, with the exception of Erbil. Most



of the refugees then further returned from Iran between October and December 1996. Animosity between the KDP and PUK appeared to have become more firmly entrenched. At the end of October 1996, the US mediated another endeavour talks for an armistice between the KDP and PUK in Turkey Ankara; yet the balance of power in Iraqi Kurdistan continues in the KDP's also Baghdad's government favour. A framework for paces talks, known as the 'Ankara Process', was established, with the KDP and the PUK as its participants and the US, the UK and Turkey acting as broker. To their annoyance, Turkmen representatives were not formally included.

Under the peace process, following the armistice between the PUK and the KDP, a monitoring unit was set up and stationed in the buffer zone to ensure observers of the PUK and the KDP demarcation line. That Peace Monitoring Force (PMF) consisted of Assyrians (the ADM) and Turkmens, led by Turkish military officers, and watched over the demarcation line until October 1997. After holding for a year, the fourth ceasefire copulated on 13 October 1997, when fresh fighting broke out. The PUK assaults upon the KDP positions brought a temporary halt to peace talks under the Ankara process. Following the out broke of renewed hostilities between the KDP and the PUK, the PMF withdrew ceasing to have any party to play (Official General Report on Northern Iraq, April 2000).

The present events absolutely undermined the United States efforts in the Kurdish region, and increased plenty of speculation upon the legality of the US presence. On 23 October 1996, the United States mediated a cease-fire between the two factions. In 1998, finally the KDP and PUK with the US mediation settle their differences and on 17 September 1998 signed the Washington Accord under the auspice of the United States Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. Although the violence stopped, the two sides continued with their separate factional governments, manipulating elections and diverting international funds to their own private Swiss bank accounts. The division between the two Kurdish factions and regional governments continued until June 2005 when Talabani went to Baghdad to become the ceremonial president of occupied Iraq and Barzani became the President of a unified Kurdish region in northern Iraq(Dawoody 2006).

## **15. CONCLUSION**

With the establishment of the Kurdish safe haven after the Gulf War, the Kurds have come closer as they ever had before to having an autonomous state Iraqi Kurdistan.



Simultaneously, their incapability to bury age old-fashion differences also encourage a common objective has created a travesty of a chance. United, they would have had an opportunity to stand. Divided, they would absolutely be failed. The Kurdish political parties carried out fighting has further explored inhabitants of Iraqi Kurdistan that there is nothing 'safe' about a UN safe haven. The conditions in Iraqi Kurdistan increased questions about the role of US, and UN forces were playing in Iraq. If the military was going to be used to protect peace in Kurdish areas, they needed to be capable to do more than just looked at the home-grown belligerents execute and destroy each other.

The Kurds owe the existence of their enclave to the West also they knew it. The Kurds are not strong position. They are always in dividing line. They are not certainly part of Iraq, hitherto they are not definitely independent. The Western powers are responsible for this circumstance lasting over several decades with no end in sight. The decision lacks to be creating as what would occur next. It appears questionable that no-fly-zone would evaporate on condition that Saddam Regime was in charge of Iraqi affairs. It was further questionable that this experiment in self-government status would ever advance into a nation state. If the states particularly neighbouring states who involved had been supposed to permit it, then it might have already occurred. Otherwise, on condition that the Iraqi Kurds continued unable of exceeding their own power fighting, they were carried out to be their own deteriorated enemy till now.

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